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Abstract—Slowly but surely, academia and industry are fully
accepting the importance of the human element as it pertains
to achieving security and trust. Undoubtedly, one of the main
motivations for this is the increase in attacks (e.g., social engi-
neering and phishing) which exploit humans and exemplify why
many authors regard them as the weakest link in the security
chain. As research in the socio-technical security and trust fields
gains momentum, it is crucial to intermittently pause and reflect
on their progress while also considering related domains to
determine whether there are any established principles which
may be transferred. Comparison of the states-of-the-arts may
assist in planning work going forward and identifying useful
future directions for the less mature socio-technical field. This
paper seeks to fulfil several of these goals, particularly as they
relate to the emerging cybersecurity-risk communication domain.
The literature reviews which we conduct here are beneficial and
indeed noteworthy as they pull together a number of the key
aspects which may affect the trustworthiness and effectiveness of
communications on cybersecurity risks. In particular, we draw
on information-trustworthiness research and the established field
of risk communication. An appreciation of these aspects and
precepts is imperative if systems are to be designed that play
to individuals’ strengths and assist them in maintaining security
and protecting their applications and information.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity risk; information trustworthi-
ness; risk perception and communication; security communica-
tion recommendations
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of information and systems security can
hardly be disputed. Year on year, numerous security sur-
veys [1–3] have been published that highlight the significant
losses incurred by businesses and individuals as they battle
old and new attacks, particularly in the online space. As ap-
proaches to bolster cybersecurity have evolved, an increasing
amount of consideration (e.g., [4–8]) has been devoted to
human users and supporting their interactions with systems
in relation to information security technologies. This effort
has resulted in the Security Usability and Human-Computer
Interaction and Security (HCISec/HCI-S) domains, and led to
their establishment as crucial areas for research and applica-
tion. Work within these fields typically studies the usability
of mechanisms for authentication, encryption, PKI and device
pairing, and generally security tools and secure systems [9].
Another domain which has also been gaining research
emphasis is that of security-risk communications [10–13] and
making security risks in cyberspace more tangible. The central
question here is how best to communicate cybersecurity risks
to individuals to facilitate understanding and promote good
security judgement. The attention is therefore not solely on
security software but also on most contexts where conveying
security-risk information to individuals is necessary. It is
this topic of cybersecurity-risk communication that forms the
focus of our work. Specifically, this review paper aims to
provide crucial insight into what aspects may be important in
fostering trust and improving the effectiveness of a security-
risk message. In earlier work [11], we have hinted towards
this aim and identifying design principles to support accurate
communication (perception, analysis and treatment) of online
security risks. Camp [14] is one of many authors that high-
lights the significance of this type of research and seriously
engaging security communications.
We begin this paper’s literature survey in Section II with an
assessment of how individuals perceive and make judgements
on an information object’s trustworthiness. A review of this
mature field should provide useful guidance on how one
might build trust in risk information displayed to individuals,
and thereby increase its chance of being noticed and used
in decision-making [15]. Next, we reflect on general risk-
communications research and the significant work undertaken
within the health and natural-disaster domains (Section III).
Risk-perception and cognitive-science principles are important
here as we seek to outline research progression in risk com-
munications and later, attempt to adapt established recommen-
dations to a security-risk context. With this foundation, in Sec-
tion IV we then review the advances within the security-risk
communications field specifically. This allows us to present
the state-of-the-art in a topical socio-technical security field.
Next, Section V draws from the general risk-communication
and information-trustworthiness research to outline some po-
tential cybersecurity-risk communication recommendations (to
be evaluated in future work). The paper then concludes and
discusses directions for further work in Section VI.
II. WHAT BUILDS TRUST IN INFORMATION
To communicate risk is to communicate information. Cen-
tral to the goal of trustworthy and effective risk communication
therefore is understanding what aspects influence perceived
information trustworthiness. In previous research [16] we
have sought to address this question through a comprehensive
review of the trust literature. That work spanned both offline
and online domains and covered numerous key articles includ-
ing [15,17–19], which assess from trust in digital information
and Web content to the new area of trust in social media
information. The outcome of that survey was a list of over
35 factors which have an effect on whether an individual
will decide to trust an information object. In Table I, we
draw from that extensive list and categorise the trustworthiness
factors based on whether they relate to (i) the information
source (where the information originated or who sent it), (ii)
the piece of information itself, or (iii) the end-user of the
information (message receiver). Albeit simple, this breakdown
can actually be quite beneficial in allowing system designers
to see at what stages a user’s trustworthiness in information
might be built, or if design is poorly conceived where it might
inadvertently be destroyed. From this factor listing, we note for
example that the identity of a source, relevance and timeliness
of information, and expertise of an end-user are all likely to
influence the trustworthiness of an information message.
TABLE I
PERCEIVED INFORMATION TRUSTWORTHINESS FACTORS
Source: Deception, Ethics, Identity (Source, Authority/Competence of
source, Credentials, Digital signatures), Incentive, Location of
source (Geographic location), Objectivity (Bias), Popularity, Pos-
itive intentions (Goodwill), Recommendation (Seals of approval,
Rankings, Citations), Related resources, Reputation (Direct experi-
ence, Predication), Motivation, Similarity to receiver beliefs/context
Information: Accuracy (Free-of-error, Reliability), Believability (Likelihood,
Plausibility of arguments), Competence of information, Con-
sistency/Internal validity, Corroboration (Agreement), Objectivity
(Bias), Predictability, Presentation and format (Appearance, Ap-
peals of a personal nature, Representational consistency, Concise
representation), Provenance, Recommendation (Seals of approval,
Rankings, Citations), Relevance, Specificity, Timeliness/Freshness
(Age, Recency, Volatility, Response time, Speed of loading), Topic,
Verifiability
End-user: Bonding, Context and criticality, Beliefs, Disposition to trust,
Expertise, Motivation, Propensity, Risk propensity, Trust in general
technology, Familiarity, Limited resources/choices
In addition to their impact on information in general, by
extension these factors may also have a significant influence on
a security-risk message (e.g., a warning prompt) and whether
it will be trusted by an individual. As such, a risk message that
is accurate, specific, presented appropriately and is familiar, is
more likely to be trusted and acted on than a message that
is to the contrary. Many of the factors in Table I are already
in use today to make decisions about trust on the Web. If we
look at Web browsers for example, identity is a core factor
in choosing a browser and linking names such as Chrome
and Internet Explorer to their respective supporting companies
i.e., Google Inc. and Microsoft Corp. Having identified the
source, it is normal for individuals to then consider additional
aspects such as the browser/company’s reputation, competence
and popularity. In terms of security, this example might
also be extended to appreciate the fact that most browsers
provide relevant and specific warning messages about Web
sites infected with malware before letting individuals access
them, thus emphasising timeliness of information as well.
These factors, and particularly those related to the end-user
and their cognitive state will be increasingly important as
system designers seek to create an atmosphere of trust and
facilitate effective risk communication leading to more secure
and trusted systems.
III. COMMUNICATING RISKS: HURDLES AND PROGRESS
Risk communication is a relatively mature field and has
been researched in detail for many years, especially within
the health and natural-disaster domains. Risk communication
can be defined as the interactive process of exchanging in-
formation about a risk (its nature, meaning, consequences,
likelihood and response options) to individuals so that they can
make informed judgements [20–23]. This activity can be split
into three goals, advancing/changing knowledge and attitudes,
modifying risk-relevant behaviour, and facilitating cooperative
conflict resolution and decision-making [24]. All of these goals
require individuals to initially consume risk information or in
other words, perceive it. As a result, risk perception forms
one of the critical initial stages within risk communication that
considers the ways in which a person actually views a risk and
the various factors that affect their perspective [23,25]. Some
of the other processes core to risk communication which are
implicit to the goals mentioned above are risk analysis, risk
evaluation and risk treatment [23,24]. Together, these activities
allow an individual to mentally understand a risk, weigh it and
make an informed cognitive decision concerning how it should
be treated.
Considering the broad focus of risk communication and its
link with human perception and decision-making, it should be
of no surprise that this is often regarded as a complex topic
with numerous factors affecting and influencing its processes.
Various articles [22, 26–28] support this reality and supply
detailed studies that identify the multitude of factors that come
into play. A large contributor to risk communication’s com-
plexity is the perceptual and subjective nature of a risk itself,
with authors [27,29] in both the health and terrorism domains
referring to it as a socially constructed and psychologically-
oriented phenomenon. Literature has discussed the subjectivity
of this topic in detail and listed key examples such as (i) the
fact that actual risk and perceived risk (i.e., what a person
perceives the risk to be) can be quite different [26,30] and (ii)
the appetite and acceptability of a risk depends heavily on an
individual’s priorities and values [29].
Slovic [31] provides one of the most influential and sig-
nificant reviews on the subject of risk perception, and draws
from various fields to confirm the assertions above and stress
how difficult, yet important, researching risk communication
and perception is. In light of this complexity, it is crucial
that any cybersecurity-risk communication approach has an
adequate appreciation of possible difficulties and ways to
avoid them, thereby communicating security information more
effectively. Considering this, we review core aspects in the
established health and natural-disaster fields that have been
found to impact risk communication. It is hoped that progress
in these domains might facilitate much quicker advancements
in cybersecurity-risk communication research. To structure our
review, we use the three areas identified by [32] in which
hurdles in risk communication may arise, namely, the risk
message itself, the message communicator/source and message
receiver (the individual). One should note the similarity here
to the categories of information trustworthiness in Table I.
A. The risk message
As highlighted in the literature [32], the risk message itself
presents a noteworthy challenge to risk communication. One
of the first issues which arises is the innate complexity of
the problems which risk information actually relates to [32].
In most situations, the problems of interest are likely to
be quite complicated, and therefore the associated risk in-
formation is almost certainly not trivial. Another basic yet
important consideration is deciding exactly what information
to present in a risk message [26, 32]. This task should not
be underestimated, because badly chosen information could
have numerous adverse consequences and ultimately lead to
individuals making ill-advised decisions [26]. The specificity
of risk information has also emerged as a possible hurdle
to communication. Jenkin [29] reports on this factor in the
terrorism context and drawing from work in [33] highlights
that communications that are not specific enough may increase
anxiety without increasing an individual’s actual awareness.
Once a risk message has been researched and the ap-
propriate information selected for communication, the next
crucial question is how should it be presented. The question
of risk-information format is arguably one of the most heavily
researched subtopics pertaining to a risk message. According
to the literature, there are three broad formats of presentation:
numeric (using percentages, frequencies and probabilities),
verbal (which applies terms such as ‘unlikely’, ‘possible’ and
‘definite’) and visual (utilising graphics, graphs, charts and
diagrams) [34–40]. Each of these types (and each specific
format chosen) has its own unique strengths and weaknesses in
facilitating productive risk communication. In some situations,
there also may be the opportunity to combine formats.
To take the numeric format type as an example, it has the
benefit of being precise, verifiable for accuracy and easily
convertible from one metric to another [36]; all useful qualities
for a risk message. The overarching weakness with this format,
however, is that it assumes an understanding and ability
regarding mathematical and probabilistic concepts (generally
termed ‘numeracy’ [41]) that has proven to be misplaced, even
amongst highly educated individuals (various studies [42–44]
on numeracy in the medical field support this point). At
the lower level of specific numeric formats, difficulties are
also apparent both in terms of choosing the best format and
secondly, ensuring it is properly applied. This is discussed in
depth by several authors regarding probabilities, frequencies,
relative risks and the importance of reference classes (i.e.,
stating to whom the risk information relates), and the need
to appropriately frame a presented risk. Research in [45], for
example, highlights that single event probabilities, conditional
probabilities and relative risks tend to be confusing because it
is difficult to understand what class of events a percentage or
probability refers to. Other research on the numeric format (in
[36,40,45]) presents more of these arguments and discussions,
and are central articles that link to various additional works.
The verbal communication format is not used as widely
as the other two but does have its benefits. Most notably,
these include possibly being superior at representing an in-
dividual’s intuitions and emotions, being natural and easy to
use, and lastly, being good at expressing the source, level
and imprecision of the uncertainty plaguing a typical risk
message [36]. As summarised in [36], the core weakness in
this technique is the high degree of variability in individuals’
interpretations. This is further supported by [40, 46] from
general and clinical consultation-specific perspectives. If one
takes the term ‘likely’ to describe a risk for example, there
is no real way to ensure that it will mean the same thing
to all individuals. This problem is exacerbated especially
in cases where it is the aim of communicators to portray
precision in a risk message. Other factors found to influence
interpretation are an individual’s experience, knowledge and
expectations [36]. Briefly comparing this format to the use
of numerical information, some authors [40] conclude that
numerical risk information is better understood and trusted
than verbal information.
Visual mechanisms including graphs, charts and risk lad-
ders have become popular formats for communicating risks
as well. Summarising the literature on this topic, many re-
searchers [34, 36] note that the advantage of visuals lies in
their ability to attract and hold people’s attention, to assist in
visualising and portraying part-to-whole relationships, and to
capture and summarise large amounts of data, thus allowing
for easier identification of patterns. Visuals may also have
the benefit of potentially being more apt communicators for
individuals with low numeracy levels; in [47] for example, risk
ladders are seen as particularly helpful in communication. The
effectiveness of specific graphics rely on numerous aspects,
including display characteristic (e.g., layout, use of cues and
colours), data complexity, user characteristics (e.g., cognitive
styles and demands) and the task at hand and cognitive load
on individuals [34, 40].
The amount of information within a visual has been re-
searched in [48], looking towards reducing complexity with
a ‘less is more’ approach—of course the potential issue here
is not displaying both frames of information and thus risking
biasing judgement. Nonetheless, this paper does give a good
example of the ongoing work in this area. Possible drawbacks
of visual tools centre on poor design, significant complexity,
patterns that may draw attention away from important details,
not stating the reference class, and obscuring relevant com-
parisons [36,49]. If not addressed, these weaknesses may lead
to misunderstandings and failures in cognitive processing that
eventually result in poor risk communication.
B. The risk communicator/source
Returning to the broad areas defined earlier, our focus now
shifts to the risk communicator/source and the challenges
faced there. The main hurdle in this regard is the reality that
communicators themselves have difficulties in processing and
calculating risk [32]. Work on quantitative risk communication
by [32] highlights various studies in which key information
sources (e.g., doctors, judges and experts) incorrectly or in-
consistently calculated rather serious risks. Gigerenzer and
Edwards [45] further support this based on their research on
numeracy in risk communication in the health field. Influential
sources such as the media have also been shown to cause
problems through a lack of care in interpreting and reporting
risk statistics properly [49].
C. The message receiver
The message receiver (or individual) introduces yet another
dimension of hurdles. One of the most significant aspects is the
question of how the individual perceives the risk at a personal
level. Important influential factors include a person’s culture,
beliefs, needs, knowledge, awareness, familiarity with the risk,
feeling of control, voluntariness, and the level of impact and
dread of the risk [21,23,30,31,50–52]. Another key aspect is a
person’s literacy and (as stated before) numeracy levels; how
literate or numerate an individual is will have serious repercus-
sions on the effectiveness of risk communications (a variety of
studies [32, 41, 42, 44, 47, 53] over numerous domains support
this reality). Emotion (e.g., fear, anger and anxiety), attitude
and affect (a good or bad feeling about something) may also
influence an individual’s perception and decisions regarding
risks, as discussed in several articles [27,32,54,55]. The fact is
that as humans, we often rely on affective responses, emotions,
and even our current mood to motivate how we perceive things
and make decisions.
Building on this discussion, a salient point made by [56] is
that most risk analysis is handled quickly and automatically
by the experiential mode of thinking (which is intuitive, auto-
matic, alert to cues and fast). The affect heuristic is one notion
which has shown itself to be important to this field and most
importantly, risk communication [55, 56]. Research [28, 57]
has also looked into other popular heuristics (e.g., availabil-
ity, anchoring and adjustment, representativeness) and their
positives and negatives when applied to making judgements
and decisions regarding risks. The receiver’s trust in the risk
communicator is a pivotal aspect as well [21, 27, 29, 50].
If an individual does not trust the source, they are not
likely to perceive the risk accurately, which may result in
an overestimation or underestimation of the risk. In [58], the
authors offer slightly opposing views noting that, contrary to
popular belief, the influence of trust may actually be limited.
Further research is needed to clarify these points. This general
link to trust, however, does support the current paper’s aim
to draw on trustworthiness research for cybersecurity-risk
communications. Before moving on, Table II provides a quick
summary of the difficulties documented in risk-communication
literature which were discussed above; for clarity we do not
restate the references in the table.
From this brief review of the hurdles commonly faced in risk
communication, it should be no surprise that one of the key
proponents in the field (i.e., [27]) has referred to the process of
risk assessment (a core part of communication which groups
analysis and evaluation [23]) as a ‘battlefield’. Combined,
these challenges stress the fact that simply supplying accurate
TABLE II
SUMMARISING HURDLES TO RISK COMMUNICATION
Risk message: – Risk information and the situation it relates to are likely to be
complex and therefore innately difficult to communicate
– Deciding exactly what risk information to present is a critical
task that ultimately affects decision-making
– Vague and unspecific risk information may increase anxiety and
not risk awareness
– For numeric messages, key concerns relate to dealing with low-
numerate individuals, choosing the best presentation format and
ensuring that the chosen format is suitably applied
– For verbal messages, the main hurdle is the high degree of
variability in how individuals interpret messages
– For visual messages, concerns relate to poor designs, complex
diagrams, patterns drawing one’s attention from crucial details,
obscuring relevant comparisons and not stating reference classes.
Effectiveness of visuals is also influenced by display characteris-
tic, data complexity, user characteristics and the task at hand
Risk source /
communicator:
– Understanding, calculating and conveying risk information can
be a challenging task even to the message communicator/source
Message
receiver:
– There are a variety of factors which influence how an individual
perceives a risk and these must all be generally considered. These
include personal (e.g., culture, emotion and familiarity with risk),
skills-based (e.g., literacy and numeracy) and psychological (e.g.,
modes of thinking and heuristics) factors
– The extent to which an individual trusts a risk communi-
cator/source has a noteworthy effect on the success of risk
communications
risk information is not enough to ensure that individuals will
be able to process and comprehend the risk message [32],
let alone act on it. There must be different strategies for
different purposes and different target groups; one-size-fits-
all is not a viable approach to effective risk communication in
any domain. Following on from this, there have been recom-
mendations and guidelines for effective risk communication
within the literature. These span techniques for presentation,
source association and optimising cognition, as well as ways
to communicate to particular types of individuals, for example
those with low numeracy levels. Some of the most noteworthy
articles include [21, 32, 34–37, 44, 45]. We reflect on some
of these recommendations as they relate to cybersecurity-risk
communications later in this paper.
IV. THE COMMUNICATION OF CYBERSECURITY RISKS
To reiterate, risk communication in the cybersecurity context
considers how best to communicate security-risk information
to users of a system in order to facilitate understanding and
promote informed judgement. In some cybersecurity situa-
tions, persuading users to adopt a particular course of action
may also be the goal. Research in the security communications
space is relatively new [14] and at this stage may be broken
into work on perception of security risks and decision-making
regarding these risks—this somewhat mirrors early work in
the risk-communications field covered in Section III. As
such, these two areas form the themes of our review below.
We must emphasise that this review is on cybersecurity-risk
communications and not general security usability research.
At times these concepts overlap, but our focus at this time is
on the former notion.
A. Perception of security risks
We start with work in [59] where the authors, accepting
the significance of the human element of information security,
conduct a survey into factors influencing individuals informa-
tion security perceptions. To guide their work, they draw on
popular and established risk-perception literature. Their study
concludes that a person’s perception of information security
can be defined by six core factors, namely knowledge, impact,
severity, controllability, possibility and awareness. This finding
links to influential factors of a message receiver identified in
Section III-C. Another study [60] supports some of these fac-
tors as it researches what dimensions influence an individual’s
risk perception of online hazards (security risks/threats). From
that review and analysis, the authors find that persons use four
main dimensions in judging online risks, namely ability to
control or avoid the risk, dread of consequences, unfamiliarity
of risks and immediacy of consequences/impact. The authors
note that researchers may be able, through an understanding of
these aspects, to predict individual’s reactions to online risks.
There has also been research on understanding and mea-
suring security-risk perception. In [61] and later in [12], for
example, the authors define a novel risk-perception measure-
ment model. The model distils common perception factors and
grounds itself in two security-risk characteristics—an individ-
ual’s knowledge about a risk and the risk’s consequences—
with each characteristic having a scale of levels indicating dif-
ferent values and measures. For instance, for a given solution
at a particular time, a person may have a low understanding
(knowledge) of a risk (valued at ‘Level 2: Understanding’) and
may view the possible consequences as quite serious (prefer-
ring, ‘Level 2: Serious, ongoing and raises ethical concerns’
on the scale). Using other defined parameters, total scores may
be tallied and then either combined into group scores to define
a group’s perception of a risk, used at later time intervals to
track changes in an individual’s risk perceptions, or both.
In addition to investigating and measuring factors that affect
security-risk perception, some authors have sought directly to
influence risk perception in order to improve risk communica-
tion. Research in [10] exemplifies this, as the authors attempt
to improve the process by embedding graphics and symbols
in information security messages. Use of this technique was
transferred from other fields (e.g., education) where it has
proved effective for information presentation. Contrary to ex-
pectations however, the outcome of the authors’ study did not
identify any statistically significant differences between graph-
ical and text-only test groups. This is particularly interesting
for our context as it may suggest that not all aspects are easily
transferable across fields, or simply, that as always, care must
be taken in researching and presenting information. The au-
thors also mention several important questions regarding how
security-risk information is to be presented, querying wording,
format, means, and even colour. These are all aspects which
have links to literature in general risk-perception research and
therefore once again show why recommendations in that field
may be of great use to cybersecurity-risk communications.
B. Decision-making on security risks
In terms of decision-making as it relates to security
risks, [62] provides a useful study into factors that impact
security-risk decisions. Specifically, the authors examine how
users/individuals make tradeoffs regarding security risks and
rewards. From their empirical study, they conclude that an
individual’s risk perception, security skill and culture do influ-
ence decision-making on risks. Although from a general risk-
communication perspective these findings are well understood
(with most mentioned in Section III-C), it is encouraging to
see them being applied and tested in the security field.
West et al. [63] focus on the direct question of why
users make poor decisions and, through numerous case-study
analyses, identify several human factors. These include hu-
mans’ tendency to satisfice (choose quick and ‘good enough’
alternatives and not necessarily the best ones), to succumb
to cognitive biases (e.g., representativeness heuristic and base
rate and response bias), to be faced with time pressures, and
to suffer from inattentional blindness, amongst other things.
Salient points in that and other related work [64] are that users
generally do not think that they are at risk, users tend to be
unmotivated, safety is often considered an abstract concept
and lastly, losses are usually perceived disproportionately to
gains. The authors do offer some possible solutions and these
range from improving security-risk awareness, to modifying
risk messages/dialogues to attract attention, or if possible,
removing users from the security decision completely (e.g.
system scanning for viruses on an input pen drive without
confirming this with a user). This work is very useful as it
stresses the importance and application of various established
risk-perception and communication tenets.
Another novel research article in security-risk decision
making is found in [65]. Here, the authors examine how
individuals evaluate online risks without all the necessary
information; a reality they view as common in the online
context. This gives rise to four levels of ‘knowability’ of
risks, namely, known certainty, known uncertainty, unknown
uncertainty and unknowable uncertainty. Their example of
known certainty is when a supplier guarantees that because of
its strong security mechanisms, none of its online transactions
leads to identify theft. Whereas, unknowable uncertainty (the
opposite end of the spectrum) is where no one knows and
there is no way to determine exactly what amount/percentage
of online transactions with the supplier leads to identity theft.
Based on their study, the authors then show that these levels
have varying effects on a person’s decisions. This is even to
the extent that expressing risks in a particular way (or level)
may lead to particular choices.
Mental models have also been introduced to assist in
security-risk communications. These models define inter-
nalised representations of external reality [13,66]. Camp [14]
proposes the application of these models, hoping to draw
from their successes in improving risk communication in other
domains. Five possible models were discussed in that work:
physical security, medical infections, criminal behaviour, eco-
nomics failure and warfare. Each of these models has different
uses and benefits in application to security communication
problems. As with any other method, however, the author
stresses that these models are not perfect but may have
their unique uses in effective communication. Other work has
sought to utilise mental models further in targeted security-
risk communication. In [13], the authors combine mental
models (embodied in videos) and activity recognition tools
to display timely warnings linked to video stills. They note
that video may lead to better comprehension than text. User
tests will be necessary to determine how useful this innovative
approach is. At a first glance, however, we identify that there
might be practical organisational issues as it appears that
users/individuals will need to watch a video prior to system
use and secondly, activity recognition and the necessary logic
need to be built into or on top of software or system schemas.
Similar to discussions in Section III, a core part of security-
risk communications is the risk message itself. Two of the
most recent and pertinent works on this topic are [67, 68].
In [67], the authors identify a key set of criteria for the design
of security alerts. These include: creation of interface designs
that match users’ mental models, focus on aesthetic and simple
design, establishing standard colours to capture users’ atten-
tion, using icons as visual indicators, explicit words to classify
risk levels, and consistent, meaningful terminology. Bravo-
Lillo et al. [68] seek to advance the cybersecurity warnings
field through the use of mental models. The main contributions
of that research include, insight into how advanced and novice
users make sense of warnings, and general notes about warning
design and presentation (e.g., amount of content to display and
considering all steps of how users process warnings).
The research reviewed above is aimed mainly at under-
standing from a non-security specialist perspective. There is
also a body of work which seeks to improve communications
between systems and security administrators of an organisation
on the current risks from a cyberattack. From the academic
perspective, Jaferian and colleagues [69, 70] have researched
this topic in depth and defined design guidelines for IT
security-management tools and heuristics for their evaluation.
In terms of security communications in particular, the authors
posit that designers should use a range of different presen-
tation/interaction methods to display information, meaningful
messages should be used, and interfaces and alerts should
be appropriate for and customisable by users [69]. Other
work targeted towards security managers/administrators such
as [71,72] exists, but proposed guidelines do not readily extend
to the security-risk communication aspects of interest.
Within industry, there have been developments in commu-
nicating cybersecurity risks as well. The domain of intrusion
detection is particularly relevant to our research as it depends
heavily upon technology-based tools to help communicate
the potential risk of cyberattack. There are a wide range of
graphical and textual-based methods available (e.g., [73–75]),
however, most of these appear to be based upon a pragmatic
application of well-known human cognition and perception
principals as opposed to a deep consideration of how to
optimise for communication of cyber risk for individuals
whose job it is to monitor activities on information systems.
One of the more profound exceptions to this observation can
be seen in [76]. In that article, the authors investigate the use of
novel visualisation and recommendation techniques to improve
the performance of cybersecurity analysts working in real-time
incident-management environments. They test their approach
with user studies (involving professional cybersecurity ana-
lysts) and report a number of positive findings, one of which
was increased accuracy in incident classification. In terms of
our research, this article is particularly useful as it looks at
key questions such as visual versus tabular displays and dif-
ferent information presentation sequences within cybersecurity
notification systems. Undoubtedly we will reflect further on
this article in the analysis of our recommendations in future
work. Next, we consider the recommendations proposed for
improving communication of cybersecurity risks.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING COMMUNICATION
OF CYBERSECURITY RISKS
From the review of security-risk communications research
above, it is clear that there is an increasing amount of effort
being placed on this new domain. Our aim is to complement
these efforts and further the field by investigating whether
principles and advances from associated domains might supply
useful guidance to this new research area. In line with this aim,
below we draw from the numerous guidelines and ‘lessons
learned’ in the very related, general risk-communications
field (original references are highlighted inline), to propose
a list of recommendations that may pertain to cybersecurity-
risk communications. Where applicable, we also incorporate
information-trustworthiness factors into these recommenda-
tions to foster trust in security-risk information and thereby
increase likelihood of subsequent usage.
∙ Planning how cybersecurity risks will be communicated
is crucial. System designers should be clear on: (i)
the goal of the communication (e.g., is it to educate
users or draw them away from a security decision that
may be too risky); (ii) what type of security messages
and communication strategies would be most useful
(in [13] for example, the authors emphasise strategies
reliant on visuals and mental models); and lastly (iii) the
characteristics (e.g., level of knowledge and education,
literacy and numeracy, mental models, attitudes/beliefs
about the security issue) of individuals targeted by risk
messages (e.g., knowledgeable Web users might desire
more specifics than novice users regarding a security risk
posed by a potentially malicious Web site). It is also
important to explain possibly unfamiliar terms or com-
plex security aspects—if users are not able to properly
understand a risk, it is unlikely they will appropriately
treat it. References [51, 77] generally support the points
above. We note that current tools arguably do not allow
for much personalisation and thus, generally operate on
a one-size-fits-all basis.
∙ It is well-understood that humans possess a limited
processing capacity. As such, designers should focus
on reducing the cognitive effort required by individuals
in processing security-risk information and/or security-
related interfaces [35–37]. This may be done by cutting
back on the initial amount of security details, and as
much as is possible, keeping communications simple
[51]. This suggestion will need to be tempered by the
current context, as certain users (e.g., experts or security
analysts/administrators whose job it is to monitor all
levels of system security) may prefer to be presented
with detailed information initially. The presentation and
format, relevance and specificity of information also be-
come key factors in increasing a user’s trust in a security-
risk message displayed [16]. Methods that appreciate all
of this recommendation’s aspects may be deployed in
practice but we can find only one somewhat related study
(i.e., [76]) on general performance and effectiveness.
∙ System designers should ensure that the meaning of
information presented in security-risk messages is clear.
Methods to achieve this include using appropriate mes-
sage framing (including assessing whether positive (e.g.,
there is a 96% chance a Web site is legitimate) framing
is more suitable than negative (e.g., there is a 4% chance
the site is malicious) framing) and providing narratives
of possible outcomes of making the decision to use or
not use presented security-risk information (e.g., if the
flagged file is indeed malware, installing it may result in
disruption of normal system services and use, invasion of
privacy, and so on). [11, 35]
∙ Users should be presented with clear and consistent
directions for action, i.e., options to respond to a security
risk faced [39, 53]. Also, designers should assist users
in visualising what the actual experience (result) of a
security-risk decision may be like. This is particularly
pertinent in situations where users may be faced with un-
familiar choices. Narratives (descriptions with a resulting
outcome, such as increased potential for system to be
compromised) may also be helpful here. [35]
∙ When communicating cybersecurity risks numerically,
note: (i) users with high-numeracy levels are likely to pay
more attention to risk figures, while low-numerate users
may draw more on emotions, mood states and expert
guidance [41]; (ii) it may be beneficial to present security-
risk numbers using frequencies (e.g., there is a 1 in 100
chance that code in a Web site has malicious intentions)
instead of (or in addition to) percentages (e.g., there is
a 1% chance that code in a Web site has malicious in-
tentions) [32,44,45]; (iii) to avoid individuals dismissing
small risks (e.g., 1% or less) or risks from familiar events
(e.g., security information or warning messages from a
particular source), an explicit message to this effect is in
order [36]; (iv) some relative risk communication often
results in an overestimation of perceived risk. This format
is useful if aiming to influence users towards a specific
(e.g., less risky) security decision but should be avoided
otherwise (e.g., use absolute risk). [36, 44, 45]
∙ When communicating cybersecurity risks visually, note:
(i) no single visual will work perfectly in all situations–
bar charts, risk ladders, pie charts, icons, indicators, etc.
all have slightly more useful application contexts [34,40],
even security-specific research by [10] has alluded to
this in terms of graphics and symbols; (ii) to promote
educated judgements, displays should be representative
of actual quantities/probabilities [36], this is particularly
relevant if showing security-risk levels or virus infec-
tion statistics graphically; (iii) visuals showing security
risks should avoid elements (e.g., extraneous pictures or
distracting images) that divert attention away from the
data [34]; (iv) if graphs are used (e.g., to show attack
likelihood), these and any conclusions that might be
drawn from the visuals should be explained clearly and
not left up to an individual’s sole interpretation [36].
∙ When communicating cybersecurity risks verbally: (i) it
may be best to use multiple formats to present security-
risk information as various authors have expressed that
verbals are not to be completely relied on [40,44,78]. This
is especially relevant for security as it is common to see
messages quoting that attacks are ‘likely’ or ‘probable’.
The core issue therefore is, how does one ensure that
these terms mean the same to all users; (ii) consider
context as this may also influence perceptions [40]—
context might span who the users are, where they are,
what they are likely to be doing in the system and the
gravity of the security decision they currently face.
∙ Some of the most important criteria for evaluating
security-risk messages in pilot testing include: com-
prehension, agreement, hazard/dose-response consistency,
uniformity, audience evaluation and types of failure in
communication [79]. Thus, have users understood the
security-risk message as expected? Is there uniformity
in risk levels and responses? Do users view security
communications as clear, helpful and accurate? Etc.
∙ In seeking to build trust in cybersecurity-risk communica-
tions, it is beneficial for messages to be given in a timely
fashion (ideally as close to the risk situation/attack as
possible), to be presented in a standard and predictable
security message format which is generally familiar to
users, clearly to highlight the reason for the communi-
cations and allow it to be verified and traced (e.g., to
an information source), to identify the origin/system that
generated the risk message, amongst other things. [16]
Grounded in existing risk-communications and information-
trustworthiness research, these recommendations may be of
great use in communicating cybersecurity-risk information.
Existing work already cited has a few of these guidelines in
terms of risk communication and generally usable security. For
example, keeping communications simple and minimalistic
[67], assisting users in seeing the consequences of decisions
[7], and engaging in some level of customisation of security-
risk information to specific target audiences [69]. Our future
work therefore will seek to determine how useful these pro-
posed recommendations may actually be.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we critically reviewed the information trust-
worthiness, risk communication and cybersecurity-risk com-
munication research fields. From that survey, we identified
several motivational factors and drew on recommendations
that may be applicable to the largely uncharted field of
cybersecurity-risk communications. An underlying goal was
to determine the degree to which these aspects are already
addressed in current security communications work and, going
forward, how we might seek to increase the overall effective-
ness of these security communications.
Having defined a number of these trustworthiness factors
and communication recommendations, our future work will
seek to thoroughly investigate their combined use and the
extent to which they may prove beneficial in the cybersecurity
context. We envisage that this investigation will involve sev-
eral progressive steps. These include, the identification of a
set of case scenarios where various facets of cybersecurity-
risk communication could be tested, the development of a
prototype system and/or add-on functionality in line with
scenarios to provide a practical basis for assessment, and
finally, user studies with suitable subjects to critically eval-
uate the effectiveness and trustworthiness of cybersecurity-
risk communications with and without incorporation of the
recommendations proposed. The online environment is a key
target area for these application tests, as that environment
may have unique characteristics to explore and/or exploit.
Although some very relevant work has been done in these
areas (most notably [67,68]), there are still many unanswered
questions. Topics such as numeric and verbal communication
of cybersecurity risks and personalisation for perceptual and
individual factors are especially of interest as these have not
been addressed in great detail as far as it relates to this
research. Visual risk-communication has received some em-
phasis, particularly in using icons, indicators and graphics in
browsers, firewalls and incident-management tools [67,76,80].
Undoubtedly the field of security usability will be drawn on
in further work to enhance/supplement our recommendations.
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